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Bankruptcy
by The Honorable W.H. Drake, Jr.*

and
Christopher S. Strickland**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Undeniably, 1999 proved to be an important year for bankruptcy in
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, with the circuit ultimately
producing eleven opinions bearing upon the debt relief process. In
keeping with the cosmopolitan nature of bankruptcy practice, these
decisions involved the court's performance of diversified tasks, ranging
from the interpretation of intricate Bankruptcy Code provisions to the
construction of governing requirements from the Uniform Commercial
Code and the resolution of potential conflicts between the bankruptcy
process and various constitutional or state law provisions. Provided
below is an overview of each decision rendered during 1999.
II.

Gamble v. Brown (In re Gamble)

The first of the Eleventh Circuit's 1999 bankruptcy decisions, Gamble
v. Brown (In re Gamble),' called into question the propriety of failing to
turn over property otherwise exempted from the debtors' bankruptcy
estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522. The debtors had filed for Chapter
13 bankruptcy protection on October 11, 1996 in the Southern District
of Georgia. In Schedule C of their petition, the Gambles claimed $10,800
of equity as exempt property, representing real estate that they owned

* United States Bankruptcy Judge, Northern District of Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1954; LL.B. 1956). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.S., with honors, 1991); Emory University (J.D., with distinction,
1995). Member, State Bar of Georgia. Mr. Strickland is a former law clerk of Judge
Drake's.
1. 168 F.3d 442 (11th Cir. 1999).
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in Illinois. Neither the Chapter 13 trustee nor any creditors filed
objections to the claimed exemption, and the Gambles thereafter filed a
motion in the bankruptcy court seeking permission to sell the Illinois
property for $150,000 and to pay off the mortgage, property taxes, real
estate commissions, and other costs associated with the closing.2
Following court approval of the sale and its closing, the debtors
received net proceeds from the sale in the aggregate of $6731.22. The
proceeds were remitted to the Chapter 13 trustee pending further
proceedings pursuant to Matter of Deeble & McBride.' The Gambles
then filed a Motion Requesting Turnover of Exempt Property to recover
the $6731.22 in proceeds held by the Chapter 13 trustee.4 The
bankruptcy court, construing Bankruptcy Code Section 522, denied the
Gambles' motion, holding that until exempt property is "'freed of
creditor's claims ...it must be safeguarded and preserved in the event
of a dismissal, in order to permit those claims to attach.'"5 Thus, the
Gambles could not receive the proceeds from the property sale until the
conclusion of their Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. The Gambles appealed,
and the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order.6
On further appeal, the Eleventh Circuit observed that upon the filing
of a Chapter 13 petition in bankruptcy, the property of the debtor
becomes property of the bankruptcy estate.7 The debtor then has the
opportunity to exempt certain items under Section 522(b) and applicable
state law.8 Congress has specified the type of property that a debtor
may exempt in Section 522(d). 9 The trustee and creditors have thirty
days to object to the exemptions after the debtor has listed his or her
exemptions and the trustee has met with creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 341.10
Most relevant to the case before it, the court noted, "'Unless a party
in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is

2. Id. at 443. For federal and state limits on a bankruptcy debtor's exempt assets, see
11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) and O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100 (Supp. 1999).
3. 169 B.R. 240 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994).

4. 168 F.3d at 443-44.
5. Id. at 444 (quoting Matter of Gamble, 208 B.R. 598, 602 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1997)).
6.

Id.

7. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1306(a), 541(a) (1994)).
8. Id.
9.

Id.

10. Id. According to Rule 4003 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure:
The trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of property claimed as
exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors ... or the
filing of any amendment to the list or supplemental schedules unless, within such
period, further time is granted by the court.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003.
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exempt.'""
Likewise, "'[ulnless the case is dismissed, property
exempted under this section is not liable during or after the case for any
debt of the debtor that arose, or that is determined under section 502 of
this title as if such debt had arisen, before the commencement of the
case.'" 2 Furthermore, "[o]nce the property is removed from the estate
[through exemption], the debtor may use it as his own."'3
Because neither the trustee nor any creditor had objected to the
Gambles' exemption of the Illinois property from the bankruptcy estate,
the court reasoned that the property had become exempt by operation of
law.'4 The court likewise found unpersuasive the pragmatic and
equitable bases upon which the bankruptcy court had sought to
distinguish the black-letter precedent of Taylor.'" Indeed, the court
found the approach endorsed by the bankruptcy court would cause the
16
court to disregard the time period for objecting to asset exemptions.
Thus, the court reversed the district court's order denying turnover of
the exempt property and remanded the case with instructions for the
trustee immediately to turn over the property to the debtors. 7
III.

ContinentalNational Bank of Miami v. Sanchez (In re Toledo)

In Continental National Bank of Miami v. Sanchez (In re Toledo),'"
the Eleventh Circuit found itself revisiting the perennial debate over
bankruptcy court jurisdiction. Some ten years prior to filing for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection, the joint debtors formed a partnership with
appellee and her since-deceased husband, the business purpose of which
was to develop and deal in certain contiguous parcels of real estate in
downtown Miami. As they began to experience financial difficulties,
Orlando Toledo convinced a personal creditor (the "Bank") not to
foreclose its mortgage upon the debtors' residence by purportedly
conveying a supplemental mortgage on partnership property to the Bank
and by convincing McDonald's Corp., which had a $275,000 pre-existing

11. 168 F.3d at 444 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(l)); see also Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,
503 U.S. 638, 643 (1992).
12. 168 F.3d at 444 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)).
13. Id. (quoting Hall v. Finance One of Ga., Inc. (In re Hall), 752 F.2d 582, 584 (11th
Cir. 1985), abrogatedon othergrounds, Finance One v. Bland (In re Bland), 793 F.2d 1172,
1174 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc)) (alteration in original).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 445 (finding that the holding in Taylor did not depend upon that case being
a Chapter 7 proceeding).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 170 F.3d 1340 (lth Cir. 1999).
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purchase money mortgage on the property, to subordinate its mortgage
to the one being granted to the Bank. Toledo took these actions without
the knowledge of appellee, who was then a fifty percent owner of the
partnership.19
As the Toledos' situation worsened, the Bank ultimately obtained a
judgment of foreclosure on both the partnership property and the
debtor's residence. Despite her status as fifty percent partner, appellee
did not receive notice of the foreclosure and, therefore, was not a party
to those foreclosure proceedings. The state court's foreclosure judgment
provided that the debtors' residence would be sold first, and if the debt
to the Bank which totaled approximately $1.8 million remained
outstanding, it would order sale of the partnership property. On the day
before the scheduled foreclosure sale of their residence, the Toledos filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and thus avoided the forced sale of their
home.2 °
Under the terms of a postpetition negotiated sale, the partnership
property was sold to McDonald's Corp. for $825,000, with approximately
$474,000 going to satisfy amounts due under the McDonald's purchase
money mortgage, and the $351,000 balance reserved for the Bank and
the partnership. 21 Appellee, as a fifty percent partner, consented to the
terms of sale but filed an adversary complaint "(i) to determine
entitlement to the proceeds of the sale of the Partnership Property to
McDonald's Corp., and (ii) to contest the validity of the Bank's lien
(formerly on the Partnership Property, and now on $200,000 of the
proceeds therefrom)."2 2
Given Orlando Toledo's apparent lack of any authority to mortgage the
partnership's property and the Bank's knowledge that Toledo was
conveying the mortgage for improper, nonpartnership purposes, the
bankruptcy court determined that the Bank held no valid lien on the
partnership property. As such, the court directed the Bank to pay
appellee the $200,000 it had previously received from the sale of the
partnership property. In the course of rendering this decision, the court
observed that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 but never

19. Id. at 1342.
20. Id. at 1343.

21. Id. The sale price to McDonald's Corp. was $825,000, which was distributed as
follows: (1) $200,000 to the creditor of the debtors pursuant to its mortgage, (2) $450,000
to McDonald's Corp. pursuant to the purchase money mortgage contractually subordinated
to the aforementioned lien, and (3) the remaining $175,000, less reaf estate taxes, to the

partnership (i.e., ultimately to appellee and the Toledos and their bankruptcy estate). Id.
at 1343 n.4.
22. Id. at 1343-44.
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directly addressed whether the adversary proceeding was core or noncore
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157.23
Appealing to the district court, the Bank argued as follows:
(i) the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
adversary proceeding filed by [appellee]; (ii) the bankruptcy court erred
in finding that the Bank knew [the debtor] lacked authority to
mortgage the Partnership Property for personal purposes; and (iii) the
doctrines of waiver or estoppel should24 have precluded the bankruptcy
court from granting [appellee] relief.
Finding that the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction and
that the matter was core, the district court held that Toledo lacked
authority to mortgage the partnership property for his own purposes and
that the Bank was aware of that fact. Accordingly, the district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision.25
On further appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the court first addressed
whether the district court itself had jurisdiction to entertain the subject
adversary proceeding pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 1334(b).2"
Noting that the underlying proceeding did not arise under or arise in a
case under the Bankruptcy Code, the court therefore concluded that
jurisdiction only could have existed if the proceedings were "'related to
cases under title 11. '"2 Applying the seminal holding in Miller v.
Kemira, Inc. (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.),29 the court noted that appellee

23. Id. at 1344.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994) (providing that "the district courts shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or
related to cases under title 11").
27. "'Arising under' proceedings are matters invoking a substantive right created by
the Bankruptcy Code." 170 F.3d at 1345; see also 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.01[41[c][i)
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2000). "The 'arising in a case under' category is
generally thought to involve administrative-type matters," id. I 3.01[4][c][iv], or ...
"matters that arise only in bankruptcy.'" 170 F.3d at 1345 (quoting Wood v. Wood (In re
Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987)).
28. 170 F.3d at 1345 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)).
29. 910 F.2d 784 (11th Cir. 1990). In In re Lemco Gypsum, the Eleventh Circuit
adopted the following liberal test espoused in Pacor,Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir.
1984), with respect to determinations of jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding:
"The usual articulation of the test for determining whether a civil proceeding is
related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably
have an effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy. The proceeding
need not necessarily be against the debtor or against the debtor's property. An
action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's rights,
liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which
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had first sought a determination of the extent and priority of liens and
other interests in the partnership property, so that the proceeds of a sale
approved by the bankruptcy court could be properly distributed. ° That
said, a nexus to the bankruptcy estate existed because (1) the payment
of approximately $200,000 to the Bank from nonestate property could
ultimately free up an additional $200,000 to be distributed among
unsecured creditors, and (2) if the mortgage were adjudged invalid, there
would be more equity in the partnership property, thereby enhancing the
partnership interest of the debtors that had become estate property at
the time of their bankruptcy filing.3 1
Having found that the district court did have jurisdiction over the
earlier proceeding, the court then addressed whether it had properly
given the bankruptcy court's findings deference as the product of a core
proceeding under Bankruptcy Code Section 157(b). 2 Although Section

in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate."
In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc., 910 F.2d at 788 (quoting Pacor,Inc., 743 F.2d at 994).
30. 170 F.3d at 1345.
31. Id. at 1345-46.
32. Id. at 1347. Section 157 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Each district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or
all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title
11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.

(b)(1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all
core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11, referred
under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate orders and
judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title.
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from
property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the purposes of
confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but not the liquidation or
estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death
claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the
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157(b)(2)(K) specifically refers to "determinations of the validity, extent,
or priority of liens" as the subject of a core proceeding, the court deemed
the lower courts' reliance upon this provision to have been misplaced.33
Specifically, the court noted that Section 157(b)(2)(K) "encompasses only
proceedings to determine the validity, extent, or priority of liens on the
34
Because the real property subject to
estate's or the debtor's property."
the mortgage under dispute had belonged to the nondebtor partnership
and not to the debtors, Section 157(b)(2)(K) offered no basis for deeming
the underlying proceeding a core proceeding.3 5 Nor did the court find
that any of the other types of core proceedings listed within Section
157(b) fit the subject adversary proceeding.36 Furthermore, while
acknowledging the nonexclusive nature of Section 157(b)'s catalogue of
core proceedings, the court opined that the proceedings at issue sought
to vindicate state-created common-law rights and did not employ any
process specifically established by the Bankruptcy Code.37 As such, the
underlying complaint neither arose under nor arose in the Bankruptcy
Code, as would be necessary to implicate the bankruptcy court's core
jurisdiction.38
LV

Roberts v. Commissioner

The third substantive decision of the Eleventh Circuit's 1999
bankruptcy-related calendar, Roberts v. Commissioner,39 required the
court to interpret the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(8) in a case that
resulted from an Internal Revenue Service inquiry into petitioners'

estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the
adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except
personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
28 U.S.C. § 157(a)-(b) (1994). In addition, Section 157(c)(1) provides:
In [a noncore] proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or judgment
shall be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's
proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to
which any party has timely and specifically objected.
28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1994). Rule 9033 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
specifies the exact procedures to be followed by the district court in such cases.
33. 170 F.3d at 1347.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1347-48.
36. Id. at 1348.
37. Id. at 1348-50.
38. Id. at 1350.
39. 175 F.3d 889 (11th Cir. 1999).
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finances for the tax years 1979 through 1984.40 In August 1990 the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service provided the debtors with
notice that they would be held liable for tax deficiencies, accuracy-related additions to tax under 26 U.S.C. § 6661, and fraud penalties under
26 U.S.C. § 6653(b)(1) for the years 1982 through 1984. The debtors
filed a timely petition with the Tax Court on October 29, 1990,
requesting a redetermination of the deficiencies and penalties. The Tax
Court entered decisions for the Commissioner on March 23, 1993.41
Neither the Tax Court nor the Commissioner was aware that the
debtors had filed a voluntary petition seeking relief under Chapter 11 on
March 1, 1993. The Commissioner did not discover the bankruptcy
petition until July 13, 1993. Two days later the Commissioner filed a
motion under Tax Court Rule 162 to vacate the Tax Court's decision in
the debtors' case because it had been rendered in violation of the
automatic stay provisions of Bankruptcy Code Section 362(a)(8). The
court then vacated its decision and indicated that further proceedings in
the case would automatically remain stayed.42
The Commissioner then obtained an order from the bankruptcy court
lifting the stay. The order, which was entered on September 29, 1993,
lifted the stay "for the limited purpose of proceeding with the case filed
by the debtors in the Tax Court, [and modified the stay] to permit the
assessment, but not collection, of any liability determined by the Tax
Court."43 The Tax Court soon received notice of this order from the
Commissioner and then re-entered its decision on October 27, 1993. 44
The debtors' bankruptcy petition was dismissed on November 10, 1993,
but they subsequently filed another Chapter 11 petition on December 30,
1993. On May 3, 1996, the debtors appealed the decision of the Tax
Court to the Eleventh Circuit.45

40. Id. at 891.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 891-92.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 892. Actually, this was the second appeal filed by the debtors. On March 7,
1994, they had filed notices of appeal with the Eleventh Circuit from the decisions of the
Tax Court. In an unpublished opinion filed on December 28, 1995, a separate panel
dismissed those appeals. With regard to the debtors' appeal, the panel stated:
"Under the [Commissioner's] characterization of this case, we lack jurisdiction
because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Under [the debtors'] characterization of the case, we lack jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was ineffective
due to the automatic stay related to bankruptcy. We agree that it is clear that,
at this time, we lack jurisdiction; thus, we dismiss this appeal. We specifically
decline to decide whether a notice of appeal filed after the automatic stay is lifted
would be timely filed for the parties in bankruptcy."
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The Eleventh Circuit commenced its analysis by observing that courts
of appeal have been granted by statute exclusive jurisdiction to review
Tax Court decisions, provided that the taxpayer filed "'a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the Tax Court within 90 days after the decision of the
Tax Court is entered.'"4" Thus, because more than two years elapsed
between the date when the Tax Court re-entered its decision and the
the debtors'
date when the debtors filed the present notice of appeal, 47
appeal was untimely barring either a stay or an extension.
While "the filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically stays 'the
commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States
Tax Court concerning the debtor,'""' the court noted that appeals from
Tax Court decisions are not stayed by that provision. 49 Furthermore,
notwithstanding the debtors' argument to the contrary, their October
1990 petition for redetermination was not pending before the Tax Court
when they filed their second bankruptcy petition on December 30, 1993,
such that the filing of their second petition automatically stayed the
continuation of the ninety-day period for filing a notice of appeal.5 °
"Section 7481(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code states that 'the decision
of the Tax Court shall become final ... [ulpon the expiration of the time
allowed for filing a notice of appeal, if no such notice has been duly filed
within such time.'"' Although Section 7481(a)(1) means that debtors'
petition for redetermination was still before the Tax Court in the sense
that the Tax Court retained jurisdiction, the proceeding before the Tax
Court involving the debtors' petition ended when the Tax Court reentered its decision on October 27.52 As such, because no continuing
proceeding involving the debtors was before the Tax Court on December
30, no automatic stay could have arisen on that date under Section
362(a)(8).53
Likewise, Bankruptcy Code Section 108 increases the period during
which a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession may take certain
'
However, given the
actions under "'applicable nonbankruptcy law.'"54
the
debtors, the court
action
by
for
any
opportunity
of
expiration
prior

Id. (quoting Roberts v. Commissioner, No. 94-8283 (11th Cir. Dec. 28, 1995) (per curiam)
(unpublished opinion)) (alterations by courts).
46. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7483 (1994)).
47. Id. at 893.
48. Id. at 896 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(8)).
49. Id. (citing Cheng v. Commissioner, 938 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1991)).
50. Id. at 897.
51. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7481(a)(1) (1994)) (alteration in original).

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1994)).
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determined that such provisions would not sufficiently extend the
applicable ninety-day period for contesting the Tax Court's decision.55
Nor had any "'civil action ...

on a claim against the debtor'" been

commenced or continued within the meaning of Section 108(c).5"
Lastly, while Section 108(b) has been applied to extend time periods
governing the filing of notices of appeal, the extension pursuant to the
57
statute was insufficient to render the debtors' notice of appeal timely.
In this case, the ninety-day period for filing a notice of appeal began to
run on October 27, 1993, and expired on January 25, 1994. 58 At best,
Section 108(b)(2) had the effect of extending the filing deadline to
February 28, 1994, sixty days after the debtors filed their second
bankruptcy petition on December 30, 1993."9 However, the debtors did
not tender their notice of appeal until May 3, 1996, making their notice
60
of appeal untimely.
V. Griffith v. United States (In re Griffith)
In Griffith v. United States (In re Griffith),61 the Eleventh Circuit
wrestled with the application of Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(1)(C).
Prior to filing for bankruptcy protection, the debtor had owned numerous
subchapter S corporations with operations concentrated in the adult
entertainment industry. When an IRS audit of these operations
determined that Griffith had substantially underpaid his taxes for the
years 1969, 1970, 1972 through 1976, and 1978, Griffith asked the Tax
Court to reconsider the amount alleged to be owed. In an opinion issued
in September 1988, the Tax Court affirmed the finding of underpayment,
but did not impose fraud penalties because the Government's 62evidence
on the question did not satisfy the applicable burden of proof.

Following the Tax Court's decision, Griffith married his then live-in
girlfriend and, pursuant to an antenuptial agreement, transferred all his

55. Id. at 897-98.
56. Id. at 898 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (1994)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. To the extent that the debtors affirmatively had sought reconsideration of their
tax liability, the court also held that the Tax Court proceeding regarding the debtors'
petition for redetermination was neither a proceeding "against the debtor" nor a proceeding
"to recover a claim against the debtor" within the meaning of Section 362(a)(1). Id. at 896.
"Accordingly, section 362(a)(1) did not operate to stay the 90-day period for filing a notice
of appeal from the Tax Court's decision." Id.
61. 174 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1999).
62. Id. at 1222-23.
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stock in the underlying corporations and certain other assets to himself
and his new wife as tenants by the entirety. The IRS subsequently
made an assessment against Griffith for his personal tax liability in
September 1989. By that time, however, a majority of the debtor's
significant assets had become insulated from levy to the extent that
assets held by tenants by the entirety may not be pursued without a
63
judgment against both owners.
When Griffith filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and a tandem
complaint to determine the dischargeability of his tax debts approximately four years later, the Government contended that the debts were
nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(1)(C), which prohibits discharge
of taxes "'with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or
willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax."''
The
bankruptcy court agreed, finding no evasion as to the assessment of the
tax but also finding that the debtor's conduct after the Tax Court
rendered its decision amounted to a willful attempt to avoid the payment
of the tax debt. The court authoritatively rejected Griffith's contention
that Section 523(a)(1)(C) applies only to conduct amounting to evasion
of the assessment of a tax. Rather, the court concluded that the phrase
"in any manner" encompassed conduct constituting evasion of the
payment of a tax.65
After the bankruptcy court issued its decision, the Eleventh Circuit
decided Haas v. InternalRevenue Service (In re Haas)." Haas had filed
accurate tax returns but had not paid the taxes as they became due.
Instead, he used his income to pay business and personal debts. Upon
filing for bankruptcy, he sought discharge of the tax debts, which the
Government opposed on the basis of Section 523(a)(1)(C). 67 Noting the
"fresh start" policy underlying the bankruptcy laws, the court deemed a
literal reading of the statute, including the broad phrase "in any
manner," to be in conflict with the goals of the bankruptcy process.'
Thus, the court looked to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and
noted references therein equivalent to "'willfully attempting in any
manner to evade or defeat any tax or the payment thereof,'" showing
Congress's ability to distinguish between evasion of a tax and evasion of

63. Id. at 1223.
64. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C) (1994)).

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
48 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1154, 1156.
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payment of a tax.69 Then, relying upon the absence of the phrase "or
the payment thereof" from Section 523(a)(1)(C), the court concluded that
federal bankruptcy law precludes discharge when the debtor willfully
attempted to evade or defeat the tax at the assessment stage but does
not preclude discharge when there has been such evasion at the payment
stage. v Thus, the court held that the underlying tax debt was dischargeable. 7
In the wake of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Haas, Griffith
appealed the bankruptcy court's adverse decision in his case to the
district court, relying heavily upon the court's intervening decision in
Haas. Notwithstanding Haas, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court's decision.
Unlike the situation in Haas, the district court
determined that Griffith had not merely paid other debts before paying
his back taxes; he had actively participated in a fraudulent transfer of
assets to prevent collection of his tax debt.72
On further appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the court began its analysis
with a notation that Section 523(a)(1)(C) has both a mens rea element
("willfulness") and a conduct component ("attempting to evade or defeat
such tax").7 3 Focusing on the conduct requirement, the court noted that
the panel in Haas found the debtor not to have hidden assets or
otherwise displayed a motive to avoided taxes but had merely evinced a
motive to leave his tax debt unpaid.74 Unlike Haas, who had simply
neglected to pay his taxes in favor of paying other debts first, the
Government contended that Griffith affirmatively acted to defraud the
IRS.75
Nevertheless, under the Haas interpretation, Section 523(a)(1)(C)
prohibits discharge only when actions taken by the debtor affect the
assessment of the tax. 6 Indeed, as part of its opinion in Haas, the

69. Id. at 1156 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6531(2) (1994)) (emphasis added by court); see also
id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. §§ 6653, 6672(a), & 7201 (1994) in analyzing comparable textual
schemes).
70. Id. at 1157. The court stated:
We conclude that Congress has shown itself capable of distinguishing between the
evasion of a tax and the evasion of payment thereof; its decision to omit the words
.or payment thereof in section 523(a)(1)(C), despite the inclusion of these words
in four previously enacted and nearly identical provisions of the I.R.C., must be
given effect.

Id. at
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

1161.
Id.
174 F.3d at 1224.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Haas, 48 F.3d at 1158).
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court cited the decision of the bankruptcy court in Griffith as an example
of an erroneous reading of Section 523(a)(1)(C).7 That said, the court
in Griffith was unable to avoid the application of Haas.7 s
Nonetheless, the court quickly expressed its own dissatisfaction with
the result produced by Haas in cases like Griffith that clearly involve
taxpayer fraud.7v Thus, while reversing the judgment of the district
court on the basis of Haas, the court called for en banc reconsideration
of its decision."0
VI.

Morgan v. United States (In re Morgan)

In Morgan v. United States (In re Morgan),"' the Eleventh Circuit
examined whether the three-year priority period of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)A(i" may be tolled while a debtor's prior bankruptcy case is still
pending. The debtors initially had filed, for relief under Chapter 13 of
the Bankruptcy Code in August 1990. The IRS had filed a proof of claim
for $29,207 arising from income taxes alleged to be owed by the Morgans
for the years 1987, 1988, and 1989. Although the Morgans' confirmed
Chapter 13 plan proposed to pay in full all claims classified as "priority
claims" under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2),83 including the IRS's claim, they
subsequently failed to make all their required plan payments. Thus, the
bankruptcy judge dismissed their first case in October 1994.84

77. Id. at 1225 (citing Haas, 48 F.3d at 1158-59).
78. Id. "The law in this circuit is emphatic that only a decision by this court sitting
en banc or the United States Supreme Court can overrule a prior panel decision.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Woodard, 938 F.2d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
79. Id. at 1226.
80. Id. at 1227.
81. 182 F.3d 775 (11th Cir. 1999).
82. This statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:

(8) Eighth, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, only to the extent
that such claims are for(A) a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts(i) for a taxable year ending on or before the date of the filing of the petition
for which a return, if required, is last due, including extensions, after three years

before the date of the filing of the petition ....
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) (1994).
83. This statute provides that such a plan must "provide for the full payment, in
deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority under section 507 of this title,
unless the holder of a particular claim agrees to a different treatment of such a claim." 11
U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (1994).

84. 182 F.3d at 776-77.
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Three months later, the Morgans filed another Chapter 13 petition.
The IRS again filed a proof of claim for income taxes owed by the
Morgans for the same three-year period. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i), the IRS asserted that this was a "priority claim"
and had to be paid in full. 5 The Morgans objected, contending that the
statute only grants such status to claims less than three years old.
Thus, because these tax debts were more than three years old, the
Morgans maintained that they could not be entitled to priority status.8 I
Finding that the applicable statutory period allowing for delinquent
income taxes had been tolled while the initial bankruptcy proceeding
was pending, the bankruptcy judge entered an order denying the debtors'
objection to the IRS priority tax claim. The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy judge's decision on the same basis, and the Morgans
thereafter sought further appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.87
Noting first that by virtue of the automatic stay imposed under 11
U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) the IRS effectively had been prevented from collecting
the unpaid income taxes during the first bankruptcy proceeding, the
court next observed that nearly all circuits addressing the issue had
deemed the three-year priority period to be equitably tolled by operation
of Section 108(c).' Indeed, this same majority approach had led the
bankruptcy and district courts to find the three-year priority period
tolled
during the pendency of the Morgans' first bankruptcy pt'oceeds
ing.8

85. Priority claims under Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) are due to be paid in full under a
Chapter 13 repayment plan, see 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a), and also receive protection against
discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1).
86. 182 F.3d at 777.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 777-78. Section 108(c) provides:
Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if applicable nonbankruptcy law,
an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period

for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy
court on a claim against the debtor, or against an individual with respect to which
such individual is protected under section 1201 or 1301 of this title, and such
period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, then such period
does not expire until the later of(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on
or after the commencement of the case; or
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay under section
362, 922, 1201, or 1301 of this title, as the case may be, with respect to such a
claim.
11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (1994).
89. 182 F.3d at 778-79.
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Notwithstanding this majority view, however, a significant minority
of courts had found the plain language of Section 108(c) insufficient to
toll the priority period of Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i). 9 Furthermore, to the
extent that the minority had relied upon the expressed application of
Section 108(c) only to "nonbankruptcy law" and "nonbankruptcy
proceedings," the court agreed that such provisions could not govern the
priority period set forth under Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i). 9'
Nonetheless, the court found that the bankruptcy court had equitable
discretion to toll the priority period under Bankruptcy Code Section
105(a).92 Thus, notwithstanding its disagreement as to the application
of Section 108(c), the court determined that a bankruptcy court
exercising its equitable powers might toll the applicable priority period,
when appropriate, while a debtor's prior bankruptcy proceeding is
pending.93 Because the applicability and use of Section 105(a) fell
squarely within the bankruptcy court's discretion, the court vacated the
district court's opinion and remanded the matter with an instruction to
consider application of Section 105(a). 94
VII.

Dzikowski v. Boomer's Sports & Recreation Center,Inc.
(In re Boca Arena, Inc.)

In Dzikowski v. Boomer's Sports & Recreation Center,Inc. (In re Boca
Arena, Inc.),95 the Eleventh Circuit better defined the requirements of
finality for purposes of appeal.' The Chapter 7 trustee had filed an
adversary proceeding to avoid, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), the
debtor's transfer of a leasehold interest to Boomer's Sports & Recreation,
Inc. In addition to seeking avoidance of the transfer to Boomer's, the
trustee also raised several related claims, including breach of fiduciary

90. Id. at 779 (citing In re Quenzer, 19 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Eysenbach,
170 B.R. 57, 59 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994)).
91. Id.
92. Id. Section 105(a) provides:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title
providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to
preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to
prevent an abuse of process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
93. 182 F.3d at 779.
94. Id. at 780.
95. 184 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999).
96. Id. at 1286-87.
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duty, conversion,
and constructive trust against three individual
97
defendants.
After two days of trial, Boomer's moved for judgment on partial
findings pursuant to Rule 52(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The bankruptcy court granted the motion, entering a partial final
judgment in Boomer's favor. The judgment completely resolved the
trustee's claim against Boomer's, but it did not dispose of her claims
against the individual defendants. Furthermore, the court did not
certify the partial judgment for immediate review in accordance with
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When the trustee
filed a timely appeal to the district court, the court affirmed the partial
final judgment, again without certification pursuant to Rule 54(b).98
On further appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the procedural questions
overlooked by the lower courts became a focal point of inquiry.
Specifically, the court began its analysis with an observation that courts
of appeal lack jurisdiction over a district court's disposition of an appeal
from a nonfinal bankruptcy order.9 While the subject order need not
be the last order concluding the entire bankruptcy proceeding for it to
be final, the order must at least "finally resolve an adversary proceeding,
controversy, or entire bankruptcy proceeding on the merits, and leave
nothing for the court to do but execute its judgment.""° A bankruptcy
order that fails to dispose of all claims or parties in an adversary
proceeding cannot be immediately appealed unless the judge certifies the
order for immediate review under Bankruptcy Rule 7054.1°1 Thus, in
the absence of proper Rule 54(b) certification, the court found insufficient
jurisdiction and dismissed the underlying appeal." °2
VIII.

Colwell v. Royal International Trading Corp. (In re Colwell)

The joint Chapter 7 debtors in Colwell v.Royal InternationalTrading
Corp. (In re Colwell)"0 3 had been separated for three and a half years
prior to filing their joint bankruptcy petition. Although Florida law did
not recognize such legal separations, the husband and wife effectively
had severed any and all functional aspects of the marital union. Thus,

97. Id. at 1286.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994); In re International Horizons, Inc., 689 F.2d
996, 1000 (11th Cir. 1982)).
100. Id. (citing In re Charter Co., 778 F.2d 617, 621 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Tidewater
Group, Inc., 734 F.2d 794, 795-96 (11th Cir. 1984)).
101. Id. Bankruptcy Rule 7054 incorporates Rule 54(b). Id.

102. Id. at 1287.
103.

196 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 1999).
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before filing the bankruptcy petition, both parties had acquired a
separate home, each obtaining a separate homestead exemption on that
residence. 1°4
In the context of the bankruptcy case administration, the Colwells
each asserted an entitlement to a separate homestead exemption
pursuant to Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution. °5 When
creditors objected to these dual homestead exemption claims, the
bankruptcy court sustained the objections, indicating that it could find
no case authority to support dual homestead exemptions for married
persons residing on two separate parcels of property. Following the
Colwells' appeal, the district court reversed the bankruptcy
court. The
10 6
objecting creditor then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
Noting that bankruptcy courts must interpret and apply state
exemption laws in the same manner as a state court would, the Eleventh
Circuit explained that separate Florida homestead exemptions can be
validly asserted by married couples legitimately living in separate
residences if they otherwise meet the statutory requirements and
nothing suggests a fraudulent or otherwise inequitable course of conduct
by the exemption's beneficiary. °7 Moreover, a presumption exists
under Florida law that a claimed homestead exemption is in fact
valid.0l'
Because no affirmative evidence had been presented to
suggest that the Colwells' living arrangements were the subject of fraud,
there was no error in the district court's allowance of the separate
homestead exemptions, and the Eleventh Circuit consequently affirmed
that decision. 1°9
IX.

Gust v. United States (In re Gust)

In Gust v. United States (In re Gust),"0 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether "responsible person" tax liabilities are
dischargeable. As a responsible officer of a corporation failing to meet
its Form 941 employment tax obligations, Gust was assessed with a
Trust Fund Recovery Penalty pursuant to Section 6672 of the Internal

104. Id. at 1226.
105. Florida has opted out of federal exemptions, deciding instead to apply its own set
of exemption standards. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.20
(West 1999); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 27, 522.08[4]).
106.

Id.

107.

Id. (citing Law v. Law, 738 So. 2d 522, 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); In re

Englander, 95 F.3d 1028, 1031 (11th Cir. 1996)).
108. Id. (citing Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla. 1997)).
109. Id.
110. 197 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
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Revenue Code. The penalty was assessed at $18,413.85, plus statutory
of Federal Tax Lien against the
interest. The IRS then filed a Notice
11
property.
personal
and
real
Gust's
Shortly thereafter, Gust filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. At
that time, he did not own any real property, but he did list on his
bankruptcy schedules nearly $20,000 in personal property, the entire
sum of which he claimed as exempt. Thus, creditors were not required
to file claims against his "no asset" bankruptcy estate. Gust received a
discharge on February 9, 1995.112
Two months later the IRS filed a corrected Notice of Federal Tax Lien
with respect to the original lien. This extended the period of the lien
from six years to ten years, making it effective through June 24,
1999.113
Two years later Gust filed a second bankruptcy case, this time seeking
reorganization under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Again, no real
property was listed on his bankruptcy schedules. However, he did list
$51,420 in personal property, $47,320 of which he claimed exempt. The
IRS timely filed a proof of claim on December 16, 1997, and amended the
claim on May 29, 1998. In this claim the IRS listed a secured claim for
$50,255.83 and an unsecured priority claim for $2,356.43 for a total
claim of $52,612.26. The secured claim consisted of the Trust Fund
Recovery Penalty of $18,413.85 in addition to accrued interest totaling
$31,841.98.114
Gust objected to the IRS's claim, arguing that it had previously been
discharged to the extent that Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(1)(A).. 5
only excepts from a Chapter 7 discharge debts for taxes indicated in
Section 507(a)(8). n6 Specifically, Gust argued that the secured debt

111.

Id. at 1113.

112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.

115. This statute provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt(1) for a tax or a customs duty(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(8)
of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed ....
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) (1994).
116. This statute provides:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
(8) Eighth, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, only to the extent
that such claims are for-
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was discharged to the extent that Section 507(a)(8)(C) only excepts
unsecured claims. The bankruptcy and district courts each disagreed,
17
leading Gust to seek further appeal in the Eleventh Circuit.
In disposing of the matter, the Eleventh Circuit first noted that
Bankruptcy Code Section 727 provides a discharge "'from all debts that
arose before the date of the order for relief under this chapter,'" subject
to the provisions of Section 523.1 Under Section 523, "'a discharge
under section 727 ... of this title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt.., for a tax... of the kind and for the periods
specified in section 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(8) of this title, whether or not a
claim for such tax was filed or allowed.'" n 9 Thus, debts within the
120
categories set forth in Sections 507(a)(2) and (8) are not discharged.
In turn, Section 507(a)(8) gives an eighth-level priority in distribution
to "'allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, only to the extent
that such claims are for ... (C) a tax required to be collected or withheld
and for which the debtor is liable in whatever capacity.'"' 2' Under
well-defined Eleventh Circuit precedent, 122 the Trust Fund Recovery
12 3
Penalty qualified as a "tax of the kind" found in Section 507(a)(8)(C).
As at the trial level, Gust premised his appellate arguments upon the
assumption that because the IRS's claim was secured, it did not qualify
for an exception to discharge because Section 507(a)(8) only references
"allowed unsecured claims." Thus, in the wake of his discharge in
bankruptcy, the IRS only would be able to recover upon its unsecured
claims, not the secured claim that it now sought to pursue.'24
Relying upon a textually based interpretation of the debtor's position,
the bankruptcy court had deemed the secured status of the tax-related
claim to be irrelevant for dischargeability purposes:
"'The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the
rare cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.' There
is no ambiguity in § 523(a)(1)(A). Section 523(a)(1)(A) addresses 'debt'

(C) a tax required to be collected or withheld and for which the debtor is liable
in whatever capacity ....

11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(C) (1994).
117. 197 F.3d at 1114.
118. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1994)).
119. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(aXl)(A)).

120. Id.
121.
122.

Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(C)).
See In re Haas, 162 F.3d 1087, 1089 (11th Cir. 1998).

123. 197 F.3d at 1114.
124. Id.
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arising from 'a tax,' 'of the kind' specified in
§ 507(a)(8), not debt
" 125
evidenced by a claim described in § 507(a)(8).
Such analysis, the court noted, was not inconsistent with other opinions
addressing this issue.'26
Fundamentally speaking, the court observed that the debtor's position
ran afoul of key bankruptcy policy and would result in illogical
outcomes. 127 Indeed, "[ulnder Gust's reasoning, the tax debt would be
nondischargeable only if the IRS had done nothing to secure the tax debt
because it would be 'unsecured' under § 507(a)(8)." 12' Thus, the court
found no error in the bankruptcy court's having rejected the strained but
inventive reading of Sections 523(a)(1)(A) and 507(a)(8) suggested by
Gust. 129

X.

Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill

In the latter part of the year, the Eleventh Circuit in Havoco of
America, Ltd. v. Hill 3 addressed whether a bankruptcy debtor may
exempt certain assets pursuant to Article X, Section 4 of the Florida
Constitution, even when circumstances suggest that the debtor may have
created such exempt assets with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors. Culminating nine years of litigation, a jury had found against
Hill and in favor of Havoco of America, Ltd. on counts of fraud,
conspiracy, tortious interference with contractual relations, and breach
of fiduciary duty. This verdict and a related jury award of $15,000,000
in damages were reduced to an enforceable judgment several days later,
on January 2, 1991.131

The debtor had recently purchased certain real property in Destin,
Florida. Although a long-time resident of Tennessee, the debtor claimed
an intention to make the Destin property his retirement home. The
purchase price for the Destin property totaled roughly $650,000, all of
which was paid in cash by the debtor. Additionally, the debtor
purchased approximately $75,000 of household furnishings for the Destin

125. Id. at 1115 (quoting In re Gust, 229 B.R. 44, 46 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998) (internal
citations omitted by court)).
126. Id. (citing In re Frengel, 115 B.R. 569, 571 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (finding that
a secured tax claim under Section 523(a) is not discharged under Section 727(a)); In re
Latulippe, 13 B.R. 526 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1981)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1115-16.
129. Id. at 1116.
130. 197 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 1999).
131. Id. at 1137.
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property with funds drawn
from a Florida bank account that he held
32

1
jointly with his wife.

When the debtor ultimately filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the
Northern District of Florida on July 22, 1992, he claimed a homestead
exemption in the Destin property under the Florida Constitution. He
also claimed an exemption in the furnishings as property held in tenancy
by the entirety with his wife. Havoco objected to each exemption,
asserting that Hill participated in improper prebankruptcy planning in
an attempt to convert nonexempt assets into exempt assets, and 13thereby
3
place the assets outside the reach of creditors, such as Havoco.
During an evidentiary hearing on Havoco's objections, the bankruptcy
court refused to consider evidence of the transfer of other nonexempt
assets by Hill, concluding that although a debtor might lose his
exemption entitlement by converting assets with the specific intent to
defraud creditors, Havoco had not proven such an intent existed. In a
February 3, 1994 order, the district court reversed and remanded,
holding that Florida law governed questions regarding the homestead
exemption and that, therefore, the bankruptcy court had erroneously
relied upon the interpretations of federal bankruptcy courts sitting in
Florida on the question of exemption rights and their forfeiture. Thus,
on remand the bankruptcy court was directed to make a determination
of, among other things, whether and in what instances Florida law
prevented3 4 the debtor from converting nonexempt property to exempt
property.
Thereafter, relying upon Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York v.
Lang 3 5 and Butterworth v. Caggiano,3 6 the bankruptcy court ruled
that purchasing a home with nonexempt funds, even with an intent to
hinder creditors, would not overcome the Florida homestead exemption.
Likewise, under the bankruptcy court's reasoning, Florida's fraudulent
conveyance statute did not affect the debtor's right to the homestead
exemption. While Florida fraudulent conveyance law had been properly
applied to situations involving tenancies by the entirety, the court
consequently deemed it inappropriate to collapse the issue of the alleged
fraudulent conveyance of assets into an objection to the exemption of
assets. Rather, Havoco should have attacked the creation of a tenancy
by the entirety in an adversary proceeding geared to avoid the subject

132.

Id.

133.

Id.

134. Id. at 1137-38.
135. 898 F. Supp. 883, 887 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
136. 605 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 1992).
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transfer. On subsequent appeal, the district court affirmed each of the
foregoing aspects of the bankruptcy court's decision.' 7
On further appeal, the Eleventh Circuit initially observed that
avoiding the transfer giving rise to a tenancy by the entirety necessarily
eliminates the property rights of each tenant, meaning that a court may
not avoid such a transfer without affording both tenants their right to
due process."
Accordingly, a party seeking to avoid the creation of
tenancy-by-the-entirety property because a fraudulent transfer has
occurred must join each tenant in the proceedings. 1" 9 Furthermore, in
the court's estimation, whether a claimed Florida homestead exemption
might be successfully challenged on the basis of an actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors was not settled under Florida
law."
Thus, although affirming the lower court's ruling that an
adversary proceeding ultimately would be required, the Eleventh Circuit
also certified the question of such a homestead's avoidability for
clarification by the Florida Supreme Court."'
XI.

Kellogg v. Schreiber (In re Kellogg)

Coincidentally, on the same day that the Eleventh Circuit decided
Havoco, a different panel decided Kellogg v. Schreiber (In re Kellogg),4 2 which also involved a challenge to certain exemptions that had
been claimed by a bankruptcy debtor pursuant to Florida law. The
Kellogg saga began in 1995 when the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter
7 bankruptcy petition, claiming a Florida homestead exemption in
certain oceanfront property located in Palm Beach. Kellogg stated his
homestead was approximately 1.3 "indivisible acres" in size, and he
valued the exemption at $799,432, which was the tax assessor's value for
the entire parcel.' 3
The bankruptcy trustee and certain creditors of the estate objected to
Kellogg's claim, alleging that it exceeded Florida's exemption for
municipal property, which Article X, Section 4(a) of the Florida
Constitution restricts to one-half acre. At a hearing, the Palm Beach
zoning administrator testified that Kellogg's property was zoned "R-AA,"
which required a minimum parcel size of 60,000 square feet with at least

137.
138.

197 F.3d at 113S-39.
Id. at 1139-40.

139. Id. at 1140.
140.
141.

Id. at 1143.
Id. at 1144.

142.

197 F.3d 1116 (11th Cir. 1999).

143.

Id. at 1118.
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150 feet fronting a road. As a result, Kellogg could not legally subdivide
his 1.3 acre parcel. 144 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court ordered that
Kellogg's property would be sold, 1and
the proceeds divided between
45
estate.
bankruptcy
the
and
Kellogg
Kellogg then moved for a rehearing and reconsideration of the order
directing a sale of his property. The bankruptcy court summarily denied
each request. Kellogg timely appealed to the district46 court, which
affirmed the bankruptcy court on all points of decision.1
Noting that Kellogg's property exceeded the one-half acre allowed for
a municipal homestead, the Eleventh Circuit observed that he could
"'select his homestead in any contiguous shape from his qualifying
lands.'' 147
Thus, Kellogg might reasonably have designated his
one-half acre share of the property, as long as the remainder had a legal
and practical use.'"
However, the court of appeals noted that because the conveyance was
inconsistent with local zoning laws, the remaining portion would have
no legal or practical use. 149 Accordingly, Kellogg could not carve out
a half-acre parcel without obtaining a variance from the local authorities."5 Given that the status of Kellogg's property would have to be
determined as of the date of his bankruptcy filing, his property had to
be considered indivisible because he had not obtained a variance prior
to filing.' 5 ' For this reason the bankruptcy court had properly ordered
a sale of the property and equitable allocation of the proceeds.5 2
XII.

Inglesby, Falligant,Horne, Courington & Nash, P.C. v. Moore
(In re American Steel Product, Inc.)

In the last of its opinions for 1999, Inglesby, Falligant, Horne,
Courington & Nash, P.C. v. Moore (In re American Steel Product,
Inc.), 5 3 the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)
still permits the payment of a Chapter 7 debtor's attorney fees from

144.
1999).
145.
146.
147.
1978)).
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

An acre is 43,560 square feet of land. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 24 (7th ed.
197 F.3d at 1118-19.
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1120 (quoting Frase v. Branch, 362 So. 2d 317, 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Id. (citing In re Englander, 95 F.3d 1028, 1032 (11th Cir. 1996)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1121.
Id. (citing In re Englander, 95 F.3d at 1032).
197 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999).

1086

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

estate assets in the wake of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. The
debtor was placed in involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The case was
subsequently converted to Chapter 11 and then reconverted to Chapter
7.154 At the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor's
attorney sought compensation for services rendered to the bankruptcy
estate pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 330(a)(1), which now
provides:
(1) "After notice to the parties in interest and the United States
Trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329, the
court may award to a trustee, an examiner, a professional person
employed under section 327 or 1103(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered
by the trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney and by any
paraprofessional person employed by any such person; and
(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." 5
As the bankruptcy court noted, however, certain of the 1994 amendments to Section 330 had the effect of removing any reference to an
"attorney for the debtor" from the list of parties entitled to compensation
denied the compensation
thereunder.15 Thus, the bankruptcy 1court
57
and reimbursement as a matter of law.
The debtor's counsel appealed, and when the district court affirmed,
the attorney sought further appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. 5 8 On
appeal the Eleventh Circuit first noted the existence of a controversy
over whether Congress had intended to remove the words "or to the

154. Id. at 1355.
155. Id. at 1355-56 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)).
156. Id. Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1995) ("the Reform Act"), Section 330(a) provided statutory
authority for a bankruptcy court to award compensation to a Chapter 7 debtor's attorney.
197 F.3d at 1355. Prior to passage of the Reform Act, the statute read:
"(a) After notice to any parties in interest and to the United States trustee and
a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329 of this title, the court may
award to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person employed under
section 327 or 1103 of this title, or to the debtor's attorney(1) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by such
trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney, as the case may be, and
by any paraprofessional persons employed by such trustee, professional
person, or attorney, as the case may be, based on the nature, the extent, and
the value of such services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of
comparable services other than in a case under this title . ..."
Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2564 (1980)) (emphasis added by court).
157. 197 F.3d at 1355.
158. Id.
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debtor's attorney" from Section 330 as part of the Reform Act. 5 9
However, the court also noted that the Fifth Circuit found amended
Section 330 to be clear and unambiguous in its elimination of a Chapter
7 debtor's attorney from those who may be awarded compensation
pursuant to that statute."e Thus, faced with clear statutory language,
the court could only conclude that amended Section 330 excludes
Chapter 7 debtors' attorneys from its catalog of professional officers who
may be compensated for their work in the course of a bankruptcy
case.'
As such, the Eleventh162Circuit affirmed the decisions of the
bankruptcy and district courts.
XIII.

CONCLUSION

In a fashion suited to the millennial occasion, the Eleventh Circuit's
1999 bankruptcy jurisprudence ended a century of fine legal interpretation with a display of judicial fireworks. While members of the bench,
bar, and academia undoubtedly will require much time to digest the
impact of these weighty opinions, one can rest assured that they will
contribute substantially to the ever-changing complexion of insolvency
practice. Equally clear is that the quality of these decisions ensures the
Eleventh Circuit a dominant presence in bankruptcy decisionmaking for
many years to come.

159. Id. at 1356.
160. Id. at 1356-57 (citing Andrews & Kurth L.L.P. v. Family Snacks, Inc. (In re
Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc.), 157 F.3d 414, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1998)).
161. Id. at 1357; see also United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41
(1989) ("Als long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no
need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute.").
Indeed, absent further amendment of Section 330 to the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit
suggested that a Chapter 11 debtor's counsel might also be precluded from recovering fees
and expenses from the debtor's estate as a consequence of the same drafting omission. 197
F.3d at 1356-57. The court stated, "We must presume, however, that Congress intended
what it said when it revised § 330 to delete any provision for the award of compensation
to a debtor's attorney in either a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 11 case." Id. at 1356.
162. 197 F.3d at 1357.
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